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ABSTRACT
Title of research paper: Investigation and Analysis of Cruise Safety in Asia
Degree:

MSc

The cruise, which provides customers with pleasant marine entertainment, has
become a popular way for people to enjoy life. With the development of economy, it
has driven the rapid expansion of the cruise industry and the intention of expanding
the cruise scale, especially the development of Asia, which has become a new goal
of cruise development. Although cruise accidents are rare compared with merchant
ship, but with the increase of large-scale cruise and passenger capacity, the safety
of cruise has attracted the attention of the global media. In addition, some regulators
are questioning the safety practices of the cruise industry. In order to improve the
safety of cruise ships, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Cruise
Lines International Association (CLIA) have issued a set of policies and measures to
strengthen the safety of cruise ships. However, the expansion of vessels and
relatively weak safety regulations continue to pose a risk of casualties in cruise
accidents. Especially in Asia, although the Asian countries have been implementing
various safety measures, but serious cruise accidents still occur from time to time.
This paper uses two-stage method to evaluate 35 cruise accidents in Asia from
1999 to 2019 and combined with case analysis method to understand the nature of
the current Asian cruise industry accidents and find out the causes and potential
risks of the them. The application of this method provides a new perspective for the
study of disaster assessment, that is, the assessment of reported accidents. Then
the accident causes are evaluated and classified by using the accident report data.
Finally, it concludes that human factors are still the root cause of Asian cruise
accidents. Then, through the questionnaire investigation of M/V COSTA
ATLANTICA, this paper summarizes the current practices of Asian cruise
companies, in order to reduce the impact of human factors on ship safety, so as to
analyze them, and put forward views and suggestions on the future development of
Asian cruise.
KEY WORDS: Asia cruise, Safety, Human factor
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1. Introduction
Cruise ship is known as "destination without destination" and "floating resort on the
sea", which is an indispensable part of today's world tourism and leisure industry. It
was originally a mean of transportation for transporting goods or passengers. Until
the beginning of the 20th century, some cruise ships began to provide limited basic
facilities for passengers, such as room and restaurant services. Until the beginning
of the 20th century, the aviation tourism industry reached a prosperous period,
which had a huge impact on the original ocean passenger transport business, then
the ocean passenger transport business officially stopped operation in 1986. But at
the same time, Cunard Lines has found a niche market that can be exploited,
because the passengers prefer ocean cruising as entertainment. That is to say,
cruise can be loved by passengers as a new way of entertainment. As many
companies join the cruise industry and invest in building cruise ships with more
luxurious facilities, richer programs and more displacement, cruise has been proved
to be one of the fastest growing vacation projects in the past 20 years (Holt & Wang,
2014). According to the statistics of the CLIA, in 2019, the number of global cruise
tourists reached 30 million, a year-on-year increase of 6%, higher than the 28.2
million originally predicted by CLIA, and the growth rate exceeded expectations.

Figure 1- Global Ocean Cruise Passengers (2009-2019)
Source: Cruise Lines International Association (2019), Cruise trend & industry outlook

However, with the development of Asian economy, in order to maintain the
sustainable development of the industry, International cruise line companies are
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expanding their business to emerging markets, especially in the Asia Pacific region,
such as Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, Princess Cruise Line and Costa Cruise Line
have begun to deploy larger cruise fleets in the Asia, which is considered to be the
most dynamic and fastest growing cruise market (Lee & Ramdeen, 2013). In Asia,
the industry has recorded 4.24 million passengers in 2018, accounting for more than
15% of the global cruise market, and the growth is higher than average.
In recent years, we have seen several remarkable disasters or cruise accidents.
With the 2012 M/V Costa Concordia disaster and the subsequent M/V Carnival
Triumphal event, the issue of cruise ship safety began to surface. Although the IMO
has clear legal requirements according to the Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), and Port States even Flag State have strict regulatory systems for
the industry, the rapid development of the news media and the high exposure rate of
security incidents also make the cruise industry at the top of the storm, since they
have to face more security related investigations and other legal actions, the IMO
has begun to investigate some of the causes of these incidents and industry
practices to address new potential cruise regulations. As early as the mid-1990s,
IMO adopted the recommendations of the British Maritime Safety Authority,
introduced and applied Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) methods and concepts to
the maritime industry, in order to get some recommendations and suggestions on
improving maritime safety. In the process of using FSA for research, we must fully
consider the factors of human, ship, environment, management and their respective
relevant factors. Although there is a large amount of academic literature on maritime
disasters, but for an industry with "explosive growth", the academic literature on
cruise tourism is "surprisingly small" (Wood, 2000). However, there are few studies
on the review and analysis of cruise accidents, especially in Asia. IMO has
introduced and launched 18 regional projects and plans for Asian countries to
improve the safety performance and reliability of maritime activities (Zhu, 2006). In
2018, nearly 25% of ship accidents occurred in Asia, and it is still a hot spot for ship
accidents (Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty, 2019). Based on 35 cruise
accidents in Asia which selected from Global Integrated Shipping Information
System (GISIS) database from 1999 to 2019, this paper reviews the requirements of
the SOLAS for the development of cruise ships, and holds that human factors,
including human error and improper organization, which are playing decisive roles in
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maritime accidents especially for Asian cruise ships. Although the safety is
constantly improving with the progress of science and technology, there are still
many problems related to the safety factor of Asian cruise ship need to be solved. It
not only has common features with other cruise markets in the world, but also has
strong characteristics due to the differences in geographical location and cultural.
Therefore, cruise companies instead of coping their inherent operation mode
mechanically while shifting their development focus to Asia, they should learn from
the excellent existing experience and improve the system according to local
conditions in combination with the special situation of Asia, so as to reduce the
impact of human factors on the navigation safety of Asian cruise ships in essence.
2. Literature review
2.1 Literature review on cruise ship mishaps
Due to the personnel density and property aggregation of cruise ships, even if the
risk of danger is very low, the safety problem is perceptual, especially the perceptual
reaction to life and property, which makes the cruise events highly concerned by the
media and the public. One of the top ten safety issues emphasized by National
Transport Safety Board (NTSB) in 2014 is advanced passenger ship safety (Holt &
Wang, 2014). Once the accident happens, the consequences are unimaginable, so
it is imperative to pay attention to the cruise safety, in order to reduce accidents and
save lives. Even so, most of the academic research on the cruise industry tends to
focus on the development of the cruise market, the choice of port geographical
location, the selection and deployment of voyage and destination, etc., and the
attention to cruise failures and accidents is very limited. In particular, the cruise
industry in Asia is just in its infancy, and the research on cruise safety in Asia is
almost blank.
Yue, J., Dulebenets, M. A. & Lau, Y. (2020) discussed the safety problems of Asian
cruise ships before 2014 by using the method of actual case analysis, and pointed
out that the special navigation conditions in Asian waters and the different policies of
local governments have a certain impact on the safety problems, but human error is
still the main reason for the insecurity of cruise ships.
Puisa, R., Lin, L., Bolbot, V. & Vassalos, D. (2018) investigated the severity of
injuries in passenger ship accidents and analyzed the role of broader socio-technical
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background in the causes of accidents. These interactions are classified according
to their causes, conditions leading to their dysfunction, and causal categories. Then,
the determined interaction is mapped to the functional model of maritime safety
control to highlight its weakest link and to put forward the possible explanation
behind the maritime accident.
Mileski, J. P., Wang, G. & Beacham IV, L. L. (2014) used a two-stage analysis
measurement to analyze the safety problems of cruise ships before 2012, and
summed up the proportion of safety problems caused by ship design, human factors
and maintenance, as well as the interaction of the two or three. It is found that due
to the progress of science and technology, it will be difficult to make a greater
breakthrough in ship design. The focus of future development should be to further
reduce human errors and constantly improve the maintenance system.
Lu, C.S., & Tseng, P. (2012) did not conduct a direct study on cruise safety, but they
assessed the safety of ferry. They used empirical methods to determine the key
safety evaluation criteria, and found that the ability of crew is the most important
factor to evaluate the safety of passenger ferry, that is, enhancing the quality of crew
and standardizing the recruitment screening conditions are the effective barriers to
improve safety. The safety equipment, ship structure, navigation, communication,
inspection of ship documents and safety instructions stipulated by the law cannot
play a decisive role, because it is people who operate the ship in the end.
Talley, W.K., B. D. J., & Kite-Powell, H. (2008) studied the determinants of property
damage and injury severity caused by cruise ship accidents. In their study, they
assessed the loss costs of various types of accidents, including collisions,
equipment failures, fire explosions, leaking, grounding, separation, overturning and
sinking. They found that the risk of casualties caused by fire and explosion is the
highest in cruise accidents, and the risk of crew injury in ocean cruise accidents is
higher than that in inland cruise accidents. In addition, they determined that human
factors were more likely to increase fatal and non fatal injuries than environmental
factors.
Lois, P., Wang, J., Wall, A. & Ruxton, T. (2004) discussed cruise ships from the
perspective of pre disaster. They evaluated nine case studies and proposed safety
assessment methods. Finally, it concluded that there are four possible
countermeasures to be taken before the cruise safety accident. First, interventions
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can prevent certain disasters, with equipment, training, detailed procedures and
preventive maintenance as appropriate interventions. Second, they listed pre
accident interventions, in which enhanced investigations, communication equipment,
alarms, remote sensors and routine evolution checklists were necessary. Third, the
exercises to deal with common events and the special procedures for high-risk
evolution are the intervention measures before the event. Finally, they listed the
interventions before the consequences of the incident, such as response planning,
emergency drills, life-saving equipment, emergency instructions and crew training.
2.2 Literature review on human factor
Generally speaking, more than 80% of marine accidents are caused by human
factors (Antao, & Soares, 2008). Many scholars use different models to analyze
from different angles. For example, the Human Factors Analysis and Classification
System (HFACS) is used to establish a framework for maritime accident analysis
(Chen, Wall, Davies, Yang, Wang & Chou, 2013). Accident Analyse Mapping
(AcciMap) is used to evaluate the impact of human factors on ship grounding
accidents (Akyuz, 2015). Technique for Retrospective and Predictive Analysis of
Cognitive Errors (TRACEr) and Bayesian Networks (BN) are used to calculate the
probability of collision accident caused by human error (Sotiralis, Ventikos, Hamann,
Golyshev & Teixeira, 2016). The probability of human error in maritime accidents is
predicted and estimated by using the modified Cognitive Reliability and Error
Analysis Method (CREAM) based on evidential reasoning (Wu, Yan, Wang &
Guedes, 2017).
Galieriková, A. (2019) analyzed the investigation report of maritime accidents based
on the HFACS, revealed human errors, classified human factors from unsafe
behavior, unsafe supervision and organizational factors, and created safety
intervention measures through people-oriented technology, organization and work
environment design, so as to reduce the risk of maritime accidents.
Lan, Y. (2018) studied the human factors of cruise safety management and put
forward that the cruise safety management is an integrated system. The
management of human and organizational factors is more important than hardware
equipment. The prevention and improvement of safety risk is more effective than the
post investigation processing; the rational planning of the overall function and the
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cultural agglomeration are safer than the traditional shipping mode. Intervention
measures and suggestions on human factors affecting cruise safety are put forward
from three aspects of ships, companies and competent authorities.
Zhao, W. X., Liu, Y. Q. & Cao, X. (2018) Seamen's professional quality directly
affects the probability of human error. By comparing the differences of seafarer
training modes between China and the Philippines, it analyzes the differences of
seafarer competitiveness between the two countries, finds out the fundamental
reasons, and puts forward the direction and methods that China needs to innovate
in seafarer education and training mode in the future, so as to improve the overall
quality of Chinese seafarers and provide a solid foundation for the development of
Asian cruise ships.
Yip, T.L., Jin, D. & Talley, W.K. (2015) used Poisson regression and empirical data
of ferry, ocean cruise, and river cruise vessel accidents which obtained from the
U.S. Coast Guard to investigate the determinants of passenger ship accident
injuries and the relationship between passenger and crew injuries in passenger ship
accidents. The empirical results show that there is a positive correlation between the
number of passengers injured and the number of crew injured. It is concluded that
the safety of the passengers on the passenger ship depends on the safety of the
crew on the passenger ship. We can improve the safety of passengers and crew on
the cruise ship by effectively training the crew and improving their professional
quality, in order to improve the safety factor of the cruise ship and reduce the risk of
accidents.
Chauvin, C., Lardjanes, S. & Morel, G. (2013) have studied the HFACS model,
applied the improved HFACS model in the research of ship collision accident, and
then analyzed the improved HFACS model combined with the classification tree
method, and found out the causative factors and key factors at all levels.
Hanninen, M. & Kujala, P. (2010) have made statistics on ship collision accidents in
the Gulf of Finland, and combined with Bayesian network, studied the human factors
in the accidents, and analyzed the causal relationship between the collision
accidents and their results
Cebik, M. & Cebi, S. (2009) have used HFACS model for maritime traffic accidents
and uses fuzzy analytic hierarchy process (FAHP) to determine the lowest level of
human factors in the model.
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Hetherington, C., Flin, R. & Mearns, K. (2006) have sorted out the main research
problems of human factors in ship accidents and considered that effective
supervision and control of human factors is beneficial to improve the level of ship
navigation safety.
3. Research questions and methods
3.1 Two-stage measurement design
In this paper, the two-stage measurement design is used to evaluate the cruise
accidents in Asia, and the nature of the causes of cruise safety accidents is
analyzed. Combined with the actual operation of today's cruise industry and the past
progress and improvement, the research gap is filled (Fischer, Cullen & Turner,
2000). Regardless of any step of analyzing any problem, the most important
premise is to determine what happened in the past. Finding the root cause of the
problem is the first step to solve the problem. The two-stage measurement method
is a new method to study disasters in Sociology of crime reporting. It first determines
the causes of disasters, and then determines the causes of disasters. With the
analysis parallelism of two-stage measurement, we can analyze "what happened?"
and "what caused it?" at the same time, the two problems are analyzed to obtain
more convincing results. This method relies on descriptive statistics in the report
results, uses the characteristics of qualitative analysis to conduct in-depth case
studies, and quantitative analysis focuses on panel data with time series and crosssectional dimensions. In the implementation of this method, the first step is to define
the respondents, so as to limit the scope of search to "Asian cruise disaster". The
second step is to determine the time interval of the survey, so as to screen out the
respondents in this period. The third step is to collect and review the data of the
respondents who meet the requirements, and then integrate and analyze the causes
of the accident. Finally, accidents must be classified in a systematic way to
determine the pattern of causality. It is worth mentioning that the definition of
disaster in this study refers to the cruise events with safety problems. As long as
there are reports of accidents that have a negative impact on the operation of the
ship, no matter how serious they are, they will be included in the scope of
investigation. However, it should be emphasized that this investigation does not
involve disease outbreaks, safety and sexual assault, and other emergencies that
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do not involve the safety of the ship itself. The purpose of this study is to provide a
broad overview about the Asian cruise accidents. Compared with other types of ship
accidents, the incidence of cruise accidents is lower, but the indirect cost of
economic loss and social impact is much higher than other ships. The prevention
scheme may be very different from merchant ships. Therefore, it belongs to the use
of multiple sources of evidence in multiple cases and multiple time periods. The
ability to prevent accidents can be evaluated in a way like crime prevention, that is,
to solve the problem of prevention by understanding the types and causes of cruise
ship accidents.
3.2 Data collection and resource
The detailed information of the cruise accident can be obtained through the reported
event file data set, which can be used to evaluate the situation when the accident
occurred and classify the causes of the accident. In addition, data sets are selected
to achieve standardized measurements between events and years, thus providing
effective comparability. The data set information of this study is based on GISIS ship
accident database developed by IMO. the "marine ship accident" module of the
database records the data of marine ship accidents from 1900 to 2020, including the
actual ship accident data collected through various channels and the more detailed
information in the casualty investigation report received by IMO, which is used to
analyze the accident data, prevent and reduce similar ship accidents (Mileski, Wang
& Beacham IV, 2014). GISIS database divides ship accidents into collision,
grounding, collision and collision, structural failure, accidental injury and death such
as sudden illness and accidental fall of passengers or crew. This paper holds that it
is meaningless to consider the types of accidental injury and death to improve the
safety of ships. Therefore, it is not included in ship accidents. At the same time, due
to the late construction of GISIS database, the analysis data of many early ship
accidents are incomplete, and the Asian cruise started late, with fewer early
accidents. (Li, Tang & Zhang, 2018) Recently the whole cruise industry is in a state
of abnormal stagnation due to the emergence of COVID-19. Therefore, only the
cruise accidents in Asia from 1999 to 2019 are taken as the analysis basis. Thought
the website: www.cruisejunkie.com which was produced by Dr. Ross A. Klein of St.
John's Memorial University of Newfoundland, we can take the cruise accident
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reports from 1979 to 2012 as the reference template to summarize and analyze the
cruise accidents in Asia from 1999 to 2019. Use the multiple archive sources
including Lloyd's List Casualty Report, IHS Fairplay, Cruise Industry News
Quarterly, US Security Exchange Commission Filings, various transportation and
maritime incident reports from government which include but are limited to Transport
UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch, Italian Ministry of Infrastructure, US
NTSB, Australian Transport Safety Bureau, Canada NTSB, Republic of Liberia
Bureau of Maritime Affairs, USCG and Marine Safety Investigation Unit — Malta
Transport Center. Finally, in order to confirm whether the data set is reasonable and
comprehensive, we confirm that all cruise ship deaths reported in the Lloyd's
register of shipping global casualty report appear in the data set. Therefore, based
on the number of events and the years covered, this seems to be quite accurate and
the archival data set is considered objective and valuable.
4. Cruise Development in Asia
4.1 Current situation
In 2018, the global ocean passenger volume was 28.5 million, and the total number
of cruise passengers in Asia was 4.24 million with increase of 4.6%, which was a
record high. It can be clearly seen from Figure 2 that the number of cruise
passengers in Asia has changed in recent years the recent five years. Compound
Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of Asian port throughput was 14%, and the growth rate
was 88%. Especially the popular destinations such as China, Japan, Philippines,
India and Indonesia have shown a higher rate than the average of the rest of Asia
(CLIA, 2019). Asia as the third largest cruise market after North America and
Europe, accounted for a 14.8% share of the total global ocean passenger volume
compared with 15.1% in 2017. The passenger volume of 4.02 million Asian cruise
passengers in 2019 is slightly reduced by 5.7% compared with that in 2018, which is
not surprising, because after years of rapid expansion, the cruise capacity in 2019
was declined (Pasternak, 2019). From the micro point of view, the reason for the
slowdown of Asian ship capacity is that covid-19 first broke out in Asia at the end of
the year, which directly affects the development of Asian cruise. From the macro
point of view, the global demand for cruise is strong, while the choice of short-term
cruise itinerary outside the mainland of China is reduced. But overall, the five-year
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compound annual growth rate of passenger traffic in Asia since 2014 is 122%. In
2019, 39 cruise brands, including Costa cruise line, Granting Cruise Line, Royal
Caribbean Cruise Line and MSC Cruise Line, were sailing in the Asian waters, with
a total of 79 cruise ships deployed, the number of ships deployed in Asia has
increased by 58% since 2014 (CLIA, 2019). Some Asian destinations are also
building new infrastructure to support cruise development. In the future, as the most
important source of Asian cruise passengers, China will take the lead in easing the
epidemic of COVID-19, rely on the vigorously support from Chinese government, a
large number of second-hand cruise ships start to flow into the Asian market, selfbuilt cruise ships will be launched in the near future, which will further expand the
development scale of Asian cruise ships.
In fact, senior executives of CLIA described the Asian cruise market as "work in
progress" as well, with Asian and Chinese routes accounting for 9.2% of cruise
deployment, lagging European (11.1%), Mediterranean (17.3%) and Caribbean
(34.4%) markets. Nevertheless, cruise operators hope to deploy more widely in the
region, and firmly believe that Asia, as a niche market for cruise ships, is worth
maintaining its long-term expansion policy. "The popularity of cruise lines in Asia is
expected to further increase in the next few years as cruise companies deploy new
large cruise lines designed for Asian consumers," said by Joel Katz, who is the
Managing Director of CLIA Australasia and Asia. "A new generation of ships will
replace the old ones in Asia, and the new cruise infrastructure in several Asian
destinations is expected to arouse strong interest among tourists." Katz added.
Table 1 - Trends and numbers of cruise travelers in Asian regions
Japan

East Asia

Sub-Total

Total

Proportions

Growth

Growth

(China &

(Asia)

(Global)

of Asia to

Rate

Rate of

Global

(Global)

(Asia)

Korea)
2005

0.23

0.44

1.07

13.6

8%

N.A.

N.A.

2010

0.27

0.72

1.54

18.0

9%

29.5%

43.9%

2015

0.32

1.00

2.02

22.6

9%

11.1%

31.2%

2020

0.36

1.20

2.38

27.0

9%

19.0%

17.8%

Source: Yue, J., Dulebenets, M. A. & Lau, Y. (2020). Cruise ship safety management in Asian
regions: trends and future outlook.
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4.2 Cruise scale in Asia
At present, cruise ships are divided into several different scales according to their
service objects, consumption levels and route destinations. For example, the largest
and most advanced mega cruise ship in the former market can accommodate more
than 5000 passengers. Large and medium cruise ships with capacity of 1000-3000
passengers dominate the market. The above-mentioned large cruise services are
designed to provide familiar leisure tourism routes and destinations for the public.
There are small luxury cruise ships, which can generally accommodate hundreds of
passengers, providing high-end marine tourism experience through water, island
and culture, eco-tourism, history and marine sports. In addition, expeditionary /
niche cruisers are exclusive experiences designed for remote waterways or
destinations such as the Antarctica and the Arctic. But this kind of cruise ship serves
only a few passengers at one trip, due to the safety and environmental reason (Wind
Rose Network, 2020). In Asia, most ships are large and mega cruise ships.
According to CLIA's report, a total of 79 cruise ships set sail in 2019, 13 of them
operated throughout the year, and another 22 operated for five months or more.
Among the cruise ships deployed, 26 mid-sized cruise ships account for the largest
share, followed by 22 small upscale cruise ships. These two types of ships are also
favored by the industry and are expected to continue to increase significantly in the
future. However, due to the huge gap in passenger capacity, 18 large cruise ships
and 7 mega cruise ships still bear the vast share of passenger flow in the Asian
market. In addition, there are 6 expeditionary / niche cruise ships, which are
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basically the same as in previous years (CLIA, 2019). The evolution of cruise
deployment in Asia is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 - Cruise ships in Asia by size (2014-2019)
Source: Asia Cruise Industry Ocean Source Market Report. (2019). https://cliaasia.org

5. Review of safety regulations
5.1 Formulation and development of passenger ship regulations
The formulation of international conventions is one of great significance to the safety
of ships. Ships can be regulated and restricted to the greatest extent based on the
provisions of the conventions. The journey to safer shipping is long, and the
progress of international conventions depends on the bloody lessons learned time
and time again. On April 14, 1912, the sinking of the Titanic caused the death of
more than 1500 passengers and crew, causing the most famous shipping tragedy in
history, which aroused the public's doubts about the safety standards of life at sea.
Therefore, the British government proposes to convene an international conference
to formulate international rules. The meeting was attended by representatives of 13
countries, and the SOLAS formulated at the meeting was adopted on January 20th,
1914, from which the first law on maritime safety was officially born. The Convention
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imposed new international requirements on safe navigation for all ships. Since then,
the shipwrecks have put forward higher requirements to strengthen the personal
safety onboard, and the SOLAS has been constantly updated and revised in
response to the major passenger ship accidents.
For example, In March 1987, the M/V Herald of Free Enterprise sank just after
leaving the port of Zeebrugge in Belgium, resulted in the death 193 passengers and
crew members, this accident directly led to the amendment to improve the stability
of passenger ships. Based on accident investigation, it is required to review and
take a series of thoughts on the integrity of the hull and superstructure. Finally, it is
required that the watertight compartment should be equipped with an indicator to
show the opening and closing of the watertight door. It is also required that TV
monitoring or leakage detection system and other facilities should be installed to
show any leakage of the watertight door that may cause serious leakage of the
compartment. In 1988, a fire broke out on the M/V Scandinavian Star and 158
people died, which led to the adoption of the SOLAS amendment to the new fire
protection standard in April 1992. The amendment improves the fire safety
measures of existing passenger ships, including mandatory installation of smoke
detection, alarm and sprinkler systems around residential and service spaces, stairs
and corridors. In addition, the installation requirements of emergency lighting,
general emergency alarm system and communication facilities have also been
implemented.
In order to ensure the safety of the sea, IMO summed up and drew lessons from the
modern management ideas and methods in many fields of the world, combined with
the characteristics of shipping management, adopted Resolution A.741 (18) in 1993,
and formally put forward the International Safety Management Code (ISM).
Subsequently, the IMO assembly incorporated it into SOLAS as Chapter IX
"Management for the safe operation of ships" (Mukherjee, 2007). The basic idea of
ISM as the most important of all international treaties on ship safety (Bhattacharya,
2012), it tries to provide a comprehensive and appropriate method for all ships to
produce a sound Safety Management System (SMS), so as to reduce human errors
as much as possible (Batalden & Sydnes, 2014). From the perspective of cruise
companies, SMS can assess all identified risks and formulate corresponding
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safeguard measures to continuously improve safety management skills, so as to
provide safe practice and working environment for ship operation (IMO, 2002).
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) regularly holds meetings at its headquarters in
London, as of November 11, 2020, the MSC has held 102 meetings, aiming to
improve maritime safety through legislation after the accident (Hassel, Asbjornslett &
Hole, 2011). The agenda on cruise ship safety first appeared in the 68th session of
the MSC, and then almost every meeting was inseparable from the discussion on
cruise ship safety. For example, during the 69th session of MSC, FSA was tried out
in the field of cruise ships. During the 70th session of the MSC, it is recommended
that the ISM Code should be revised in order to enhance the standard safety
exercise of ship operation and maintain the risk-free working environment of the
cruise industry. In May 2000, at the 72nd meeting of MSC, former IMO Secretary
General William O'Neill proposed for the first time to strengthen the safety of large
passenger ships, and MSC revised the ship safety work plan during the 73rd to 79th
meetings. In the 81st meeting, the fire protection of cruise balcony was discussed in
depth, and the need to avoid casualties caused by the safety of large cruise ships
was emphasized.
The attraction of cruise lies in the opportunity to visit remote areas of the world,
which greatly increases the difficulty of providing search and rescue assistance from
shoreside in case of emergency. Therefore, based on the concept of "the ship itself
is the best lifeboat", MSC passed Resolution MSC.216 (82) in August 2006, namely
Safe Return to Port (SRtP) requirement was adopted, which means that passenger
ships with a length of more than 120m or more than three Main Vertical Zones
(MVZ) built after July 1, 2010, need to meet the requirement that they can reach the
nearest safe port by their own power in case of fire or flood within the casualty
threshold, it greatly improves the requirements of ship survivability. Then, at the
80th, 83rd, 84th and 86th meetings, the changes needed for risk-based assessment
process, amendment of SOLAS protocol and FSA revision were discussed
respectively.
One hundred years after the sinking of the Titanic, on January 13, 2012, the modern
cruise M/V Costa Concordia, carrying 4229 passengers and crew, ran aground on a
reef off the Italy Giglio Island, 32 people were killed. As a result of this accident, the
safety of large passenger ships has once again attracted great public attention, and
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the potential safety hazards related to human factors have also triggered more
discussions, 27 member states of the European Union, the United States, the CLIA,
the International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) and the other Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGO) have respectively submitted a comment document to the IMO.
Therefore, during the 90th, 91st and 92nd sessions of MSC, the mandatory
implementation of cruise ship emergency response and muster policy were carried
out; recording the nationality of persons on board; Revisioning of " Guidance on
Voyage Planning" was incorporated into the long-term plan for passenger ship
safety as an unplanned output; non navigational personnel on duty were restricted
to enter the bridge to avoid unnecessary disruptions and distractions to the bridge
team; the number of spare life jackets should not be less than the number of
passenger in each MVZ; at least one lifeboat to be loaded and released with a
quantity consistent with its certified maximum passenger capacity every 6 months
for training purpose, etc. such items have been conducted in-depth research and
discussion. Finally, the revised MSC.1/Circ.1446/ Rev.1, which is a temporary
measure to improve the safety of passenger ships, was reviewed and approved.
During the 93rd session of MSC held in London headquarters, the long-term action
plan focusing on cruise safety was revised. In particular, the MSC has put forward a
series of new requirements, including installing watertight doors and double bottom
hull in the engine room and instructing the crew to enhance the damage stability and
survivability of ship (MSC, 2014). In the 98th session of MSC, the implementation of
E-navigation strategy and operational safety is proposed, the MSC.421 (98) was
adopted which as well related to SOLAS 2020 stability amendment, it improved the
requirements of passenger ship stability in case of damage. The probability damage
stability evaluation method is still used, but compared with SOLAS2009, the
required subdivision index is further increased, which requires higher requirements
for the stability and survivability of passenger ships (IMO, 2017).
5.2 Summary Analysis and Recommendations
Although a series of safety measures and policies are constantly updated and
revised to prevent the recurrence of cruise accidents (Knudsen & Hassler, 2011).
However, according to the relevant legal provisions of SOLAS, it only distinguishes
between passenger ships and cargo ships, and defines a ship carrying more than 12
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passengers as a passenger ship. However, considering the huge differences
between cruise ships and ordinary passenger ships and Ro / Ro passenger ships,
such as the large number of passengers, the high cost of the ship itself, and the
frequent port entry and exit, more targeted legislation should be implemented for
cruise ships.
Moreover, for Asian cruise ships, the relevant laws and regulations of safety
management are not enough, and the implementation of different maritime rules and
standards leads to the continuous occurrence of accidents. The differences in rules
and standards are determined by different normal factors related to population size,
economic development level and national territory size (Zhu, 2006). However, so far,
there is no MSC discussion force on the Asia cruise ship safety. At present, the
further restriction and regulation of cruise safety requirements mainly depends on
the conscious internal procedure and requirement of cruise companies, which leads
to the system blind spot in the process of cruise safety supervision and
management.
6. Factual information analysis of cruise accidents
6.1 Descriptive statistics
6.1.1 Global cruise incident
According to G. P. Wild (International) Limited report, Significant Operational
Accident (Significant OI) is defined as: the delay of the announced journey of the
ship for more than 24 hours; the death or serious injury of passengers and crew.
Minor Operational Accident (Minor OI) is defined as: the vessel is delayed for 24
hours or less in violation of the published itinerary; passengers and crew are slightly
injured. It has analyzed the global cruise accidents from 2009 to 2019, as shown in
Figure 5. Although the number of accidents fluctuates every year, the accidents in
the cruise industry generally show a downward trend. This has something to do with
the progress of science and technology to make more advanced equipment applied
to cruise ships, and also benefits from the continuous improvement of rules and
regulations to make SMS better implemented onboard.
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Figure 3 - Underlying trend in Significant OI and Minor OI (2009-2019)
Source: G. P. Wild (International) Limited (2020)

6.1.2 Aisa Cruise Inccident
This paper is based on the statistics of maritime accidents in GISIS database.
However, the comprehensive classification of observed cruise accidents in this
database is based on IMO accident investigation, so the cruise ship is not listed as a
separate category by the ship type selection. Therefore, only 50 meters of
passenger ships can be selected as the selection criteria, and then the accident
reports are analyzed one by one according to different accident reasons. The final
statistical analysis shows that 35 cruise safety accidents in Asia were in line with the
scope of study from 1999 to 2019.
It is clear from Table 3 that the Philippines, Indonesia, Japan and China are the
countries with the most cruise accidents in Asia. Of all the cruise accidents in Asia,
31.43% occurred in the Philippines, followed by Japan, China and Indonesia,
accounting for 20%, 17.14% and 14.28% respectively, while the accident rate in
other Asian countries is relatively low, no more than 10%. This is closely related to
the geographical environment and traffic conditions of Asian countries. Due to the
complex navigation conditions and the development of local fisheries, archipelagic
countries have brought great trouble to the navigation of large ships, especially the
frequent berthing and departure of ocean-going cruise ships, which is also an
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important external objective factor of frequent accidents of Asian cruise ships. In
addition, it is not difficult to see that although the total number of cruise ships in Asia
has been increasing in recent years, the number of accidents in the above countries
remains at a relatively low level, so the accident rate shows a downward trend.
However, there have been more than one safety accident in Thailand recently, the
accident rate has increased relatively. The reason should be related to the
policymaking of governments and the effective intervention of Port State Control
(PSC).

Figure 4 - Cruise Ship Accident in Asian by country (1999-2019)
Source: GISIS: Marine Casualties and Incidents. https://gisis.imo.org/Public/MCI/Default.aspx

Figure 4 shows the total number of cruise accidents caused by various reasons in
Asia from 1999 to 2019. As can be seen from it, the most common causes of fire /
explosion account for 31.4%, collision and overturning / overturning account for
20%, hull / machinery account for 8.57%, grounding / grounding, sinking, bad
weather and contact account for only 5.71% and 2.86% respectively. It is not difficult
to see that in addition to the impact of bad weather is an uncontrollable
environmental factor, more than 90% of cruise accidents are caused by human
factors.
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Figure 5 - Main kinds of cruise ship accidents in Asia (1999-2019)
Source: GISIS: Marine Casualties and Incidents. https://gisis.imo.org/Public/MCI/Default.aspx

6.2 Case study
October 1, 2012, about 20:23 HKT, Hong Kong Lamma Island Rongshuwan area
collision accident, The M/V Lamma IV which belongs to Hong Kong Electric Group
Co., Ltd. was carrying staff and family members to watch fireworks, her stern hit the
bow of M/V Sea Smooth which belongs to Hong Kong Kowloon Ferry Holding Co.,
Ltd., the collision broken the two watertight compartments of the ship and hence,
permitting the ship to speed up diffusing the water. Although there are many life
jackets available onboard, but there are still more than 100 passengers were thrown
into the water unprotected. In the end, 39 people were killed and 92 injured in the
most serious maritime disaster in Hong Kong since 1971.
By analyzing the accident report, a few minutes before the collision, the two ships
did not slow down or significantly change direction, it can be judged that the two
ships are in the state of "high speed collision". Experts believe that the main cause
of the accident is that the OOW failed to sail at a safe speed while neglecting to
watch, did not give way in time when the risk of collision existed, and did not carry
out emergency operation in accordance with the provisions of COLREGs when the
close quarter situation was existed. In addition, the captain of M/V Lamma IV which
sank after the collision, he did not use the correct and effective emergency
measures to evacuate passengers and save their lives as much as possible, also
did not pay attention to the radar before sailing from Lamma Island. Otherwise,
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accidents should be avoided. Therefore, it was finally determined that the accident
was caused by various human factors (Lunn & Tang, 2013).
7. Research on human factor
7.1 Definition of human factor
Manmade is relative to nature. In today's world, there are both natural and manmade worlds. Almost all science and technology are inseparable from human
invention and manufacturing. However, with the progress of science and technology,
technological failures gradually decrease, which in turn reveals the potential impact
level of human errors in the causal relationship of accidents (Hetherington, Flin &
Mearns, 2006). Human factor refers to the adverse effect of human behavior on the
correct function or successful performance of the system when people complete a
specific task. Human factors involve psychology, behavioral science, management,
system security, ergonomics and other fields. The function and influence of human
in man-machine environment system are studied. The individual is far more than a
factor of production. There is a relationship between people and things in any
organization. But in the final analysis, the relationship between people and things is
the relationship between people, and the allocation of any resources is also people
oriented. Because people not only have material needs, but also spiritual needs,
social and cultural background, historical tradition, social system, people's values,
people's material interests, people's mental state, people's quality, people's beliefs
will have an impact on people's activities. Due to the above factors, in the process of
completing a specific task, whether people have enough comprehensive ability to
deal with various situations that may occur in the process has become the key factor
to complete the task safely. When people make mistakes in consciousness,
judgment and behavior, they do not make the most appropriate judgment on the
situation at that time, which eventually leads to the task cannot be completed in the
right way. This is the so-called human error. It can also be said that the wrong
decisions and behaviors of operators will lead to system failure, efficiency reduction
or performance damage (Xi, 2006).
Human factors have been identified as the most important cause of maritime
accidents (Kujala, Hänninen, Arola & Ylitalo, 2009). In Part B-VI-1/12 of STCW, the
importance of bridge team is emphasized, and it is pointed out that "the crew
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participating in bridge team work must be composed of sufficient, competent and
different ranks of seafarer. They must have clear division of labor, clear task for
everyone, clear dialogue and contact between everyone, and concentrate on their
work. Only in this way can they timely reflect the changes in the environment and
situation and take effective measures at any time." Although the probability of cruise
accidents is far less than that of freighters, human error is still the most significant
factor in cruise accidents. For the Asian cruise accident, it not only has the common
characteristics of the global cruise, but also has its own particularity because of its
special geographical location and specific historical stage.
7.2 SHEL Model application
Professor Edwards first proposed SHEL model in 1972, and then Professor Hawkins
modified it, and finally formed a model framework widely used in human factors
research. The principle of SHEL model is to study and analyze the relationship
between other elements and human interaction based on human core elements.
The name of the shell model comes from the initial of its feature name. S: Software,
H: hardware, E: environment, L: lifeware. It is not difficult to find from Figure 5 that
the core of the system is lifeware, and the L-S (Liveware-Sofeware), L-H (LivewareHardware), L-E (Liveware-Environment), L-L (Liveware-Liveware) are all related to
it. They together constitute the whole system that affects human factors, and the
edges of blocks are serrated rather than simple straight line, which means that all
elements must be matched around human, and human should also take the initiative
to adapt. In order to fully realize the functions and objectives of the system, the
relationship between various elements should be strengthened (Zhu,2020).
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Figure 6 - SHEL Mode
Source: Internet

7.2.1 Liveware-Hardware
The first element that must match people is hardware. With the continuous
development of science and technology, the stability of ship hardware is constantly
improving, but this cannot ignore the existence of the relationship between human
and hardware, because the normal operation of hardware depends on human
operation and maintenance. The design characteristics of hardware should be
integrated with human factors, easy to operate, in line with the normal operation
habits of people; at the same time, people should also adapt to the hardware,
master its performance, improve the operation ability, and strengthen the
maintenance of the hardware. The two need to complement each other in order to
minimize the adverse impact of human error.
7.2.2 Liveware-Software
The problems in the relationship between human and software are often prominent
problems in accidents, which are difficult to find and solve. It is mainly people and
management, such as work rules and regulations, safety training and exercises,
educational background, navigation information, etc. Ism rules (international safety
management rules) point out that about 80% of marine accidents caused by human
factors can be controlled by effective management, that is, by strengthening the
safety management of ship. At present, although all cruise companies have
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established a safety management system (SMS), some companies completely copy
other companies’ management system when establishing their own system, and do
not seriously modify it in combination with the actual situation of the company. Some
company leaders do not know enough about the establishment of the system, nor
do they have effective specific operations. In addition, some crew members did not
strictly implement the SMS and violated the navigation control procedures. All these
are great potential dangers of human error to safety.
7.2.3 Liveware-Environment
The human environment relationship here mainly refers to the influence of the living
and working environment on the ship and the external environment of the ship on
people. For example, under the high pressure of the working atmosphere, fatigue
caused by heavy workload; long contract period, the crew's life is boring caused by
the separation from the society and family; lack of accommodation, diet, sports and
entertainment, which affects the physical and mental health; fatigue caused by bad
weather such as rainy and foggy season, strong wind and waves, navigation in the
sea area, etc. These are factors that affect the increase of human errors
7.2.4 Liveware-Liveware
That is, the interpersonal relationship and cooperation between the bridge team in
the work. The factors that determine whether this interface works well are the
influence of leadership, interpersonal relationship and team cooperation on
individual performance. Ship navigation safety also depends on the mutual help,
cooperation and cooperation between everyone. For example, the power gradient of
the bridge team, the inability to question wrong decisions caused by collective
thinking, communication obstacles or mistakes, lack of adequate Manning or
effective supervision and management are all the inducing factors of human errors
affecting the safety of ship navigation.
7.3 Feasibility analysis of SHEL model
(1) Operability. Because SHEL model has good classification characteristics for
human factors of accidents, it is easy to use it for classifying human factors of
accidents. We can start from the meaning of the four elements of SHEL model in
ship navigation safety system, combined with HFACS system and the classification
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of human factors in aviation field. Therefore, it can realize the classification of
human factors in ship accidents, and the words used in classification are easy to
grasp for the relevant personnel in the shipping industry.
(2) Integrity. Most of the existing analysis models of human factors in accidents
focus on people themselves, while ignoring other factors in the system. A system
involves many factors, such as human, software, hardware and environment. We
should not only analyze the impact of human's own role on accidents, but also
analyze the impact of interaction between human and other factors on accidents.
Using SHEL model to analyze the human factors in ship accidents can
comprehensively cover all factors of the ship system and understand the causes
and evolution process of the accidents from a macro perspective. Combined with
the shipping background, the questionnaire defines the meaning of the interaction
between human and various elements, then realizes the comprehensive and
systematic analysis of human factors in ship accidents. Therefore, the SHEL model
is used to classify and define the human factors existing in the navigation safety
system, and its integrity is guaranteed.
(3) Compatibility. The SHEL model can be used to analyze the accidents in the
shipping industry. It is also applicable to other industries, such as aviation, mining
and petrochemical fields. We only need to adjust the model according to the
background, and its compatibility can be guaranteed.
(4) Inheritance. Making full use of the existing research results and according to the
internationally recommended classification method of human factors, it inherits a lot
of previous discussions on the classification model of human factors and the
classification analysis of human factors.
7.4 Questionnaire result
The questionnaire is based on SHEL model, using in the Asia cruise fleet, 60
navigators were participated for questionnaire randomly. 58 questionnaires were
collected, of which 55 were available, and the effective rate of the questionnaire
reached to 91.67%, so it was acceptable and reliable for survey. The data collected
are as follows:
Table 2 - Result of the questionnaire
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L-H

L-S

L-E

L-L

Unimportant

Important

Very important

(1 point)
40
20
5
16
30
8
5
20
10
20
18
4
15
28
2
10
6
18
5
20

(2points)
10
23
23
32
20
10
22
25
18
20
25
14
28
22
18
10
10
20
22
30

(3point)
8
15
30
10
8
40
31
13
30
18
15
40
15
8
38
38
42
20
31
8

Complexity of INS
Reliability of INS
Lack of Maintenance
System Failure
Unreasonable Design
Clear Procedure
Education Background
Training Onboard
Safety Drill
Navigation Information
Noise
Fatigue
Living Condition
Weather Condition
Traffic Situation
Collective Thinking
Rank Hierarchy
Communication Mistake
Insufficient Manning
Lack of supervision

Source: Author

According to the number of votes shown in the questionnaire and the weight of
different degrees of importance, the corresponding total score of classification was
calculated.
Table 3 - The importance of different factors through scores
L-H

L-S

Sub-Score

Total Score

Complexity of INS

84

540

Reliability of INS

111

Lack of Maintenance

141

System Failure

110

Unreasonable Design

94

Clear Procedure

148

Education Background

142

25

649

Training Onboard

109

Safety Drill

136

Navigation Information

114

Noise

113

Fatigue

152

Living Condition

116

Weather Condition

96

Traffic Situation

152

Collective Thinking

144

Rank Hierarchy

152

Communication Mistake

118

Insufficient Manning

142

Lack of supervision

104

L-E

L-L

629

660

Source: Author

8. Courses of human factor
Through the analysis of the results of the questionnaire, compared with the other
three items, L-H has the least impact, and the other three items have more serious
impact on human error. There are several prominent single factors in the survey:
lack of maintenance, clear procedure, safety drill, education background, fatigue,
traffic situation, collective thinking, rank hierarchy, insufficient manning.
8.1 Lack of maintenance
Ship maintenance is the process of inspection, repairment and maintenance of ship
structure, mechanical and electrical equipment and devices. During the long-term
operation of ship hull structure, mechanical equipment and parts, due to various
internal factors and external conditions, they will be gradually corroded, worn and
damaged, resulting in the failure of ship mechanical parts and equipment. Therefore,
in order to keep the good condition of the ship, the crew must inspect, maintain and
repair the ship, replace the faulty parts in time, and eliminate the equipment failure,
which is not only of great significance to the safety of ship navigation, but also to
extend the service life of the ship.
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First of all, due to the long-term non-stop operation of modern cruise ships and
frequent berthing and departing, the flexibility of modern cruise ships depends on
the frequent changes of machine operation speed, which itself greatly increases the
consumption of ships. Secondly, because most of the cruise ships operating in Asia
are European and American cruise ships, the flag state requirements are inevitably
different from the policies of Asian port states. Therefore, the maintenance work is
often subject to various restrictions of port states, and the application procedures
are complex, time-consuming and laborious. Coupled with the limitation of short
berthing time of cruise ships, many maintenance tasks cannot be completed on
time.
8.2 Neglect of procedure and safety drill
When the emergency happens, external assistance can only be used as a
supplementary means, the crew must perform the emergency duty in the ship's
emergency response measures based on self-help. The successful emergency
performance depends on well-trained crew, perfect emergency facilities and
equipment, feasible emergency plan, correct wisdom and good team cooperation.
This requires the crew to carry out routine maintenance and inspection for
emergency equipment, in order to keep it always in a complete and good standby
state, so that it can be used at any time in case of emergency. At the same time,
cruise companies are required to formulate detailed ERP according to the actual
situation and external environment of different ships, and specify the frequency and
participants of regular drills, so as to ensure that they are familiar with the
emergency procedure according to their own emergency duty or even more, in case
they can cover the emergency duty for others when necessary. This requires the
effective implementation of the usual safety drill, acting as a real emergency to
simulate the operation, in order to play the role of training, and find out the defects
and problems to correct in time. But most of the time, due to the short alongside
time in port and the heavy task of shore-based maintenance, the crews are easy to
slack off in frequent safety drill. In particular, if the captain and other senior officers
do not pay enough attention to the idea and play a good exemplary role in action, it
will lead to a mere formality of the drill, resulting in poor emergency response ability
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of the crew, being at a loss in the actual emergency situation, and causing potential
dangers of ship safety caused by human errors.
8.3 Education background
According to the research of Japanese experts, the direct cause of man-made
accidents is lack of skills, accounting for 50.6% of the accidents, safety attitude
accounting for 19.2% of the accidents, and 81% of drivers have wrong perception.
Due to the different education, maritime qualifications, self-control ability, judgment
ability and personality of the crew, they will eventually adopt their own ways of
behavior for the same incident and produce different results. The main factors
affecting the safety behavior of the crew are the knowledge, skills, experience,
psychological and physical health of the crew. It can reflect that the crew's
competency and professional quality need to be further improved. It also shows that
the overall level of crew's quality has a direct impact on the probability of safety
problems caused by human error. The crew market has continued to shift from
traditional maritime countries, such as Western Europe, Japan and North America,
to the Far East, the South Asian subcontinent and Eastern Europe. One of the
reasons for these changes is the low cost. As we all know, the salary level of
European and American seafarers is much higher than that of Asian seafarers.
Therefore, in order to save costs, most shipping enterprises choose to use Asian
seafarers to replace European and American seafarers as operation level officers,
and retain European and American seafarers as management level combination.
This creates language and cultural barriers, which may lead to wrong
communication. On the other hand, due to the fact that the mastery of English
among Asian people is still in a relatively low level, in many cases, even though
European and American pilots can communicate well with internal personnel, they
cannot communicate effectively with other Asian ships that meet at sea. Especially,
China and Japan, as the main source and visiting place of Asian cruise ships,
although English should be used as an international language, due to long-term
historical reasons, the popularity of English in these two countries is still poor.
Judging from the development of Asia, these problems are still difficult to be
effectively solved in a short time.
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8.4 Fatigue
Fatigue is always fatal when it comes to human factors in maritime safety. According
to a report issued by the Adelaide Sleep Research Center, the risk of a seafarer who
does not fall asleep at least 7 hours is equivalent to the risk of a person with a blood
alcohol concentration of up to 0.05%. This makes us wonder whether fatigue
reflected in overtime work is equivalent to drunk driving, and real evidence shows
that fatigue truly result in disastrous consequences. In addition, the Institute of
Medicine Committee Sleep Medicine and Research has also adopted more and
more evidence that insufficient sleep has a great negative impact on behavioral
cognition and quickly thinking decisions. It should be considered that the crew
members work uninterruptedly every day during a contract period, their fatigue
becomes more and more serious as time goes by. Safety culture of cruise ship that
psychosocial work environment has a significant impact on crew's safety
commitment (EK & Roland, 2005). Therefore, the results of this study show that
seafarers working on passenger ships show the highest level of exertion, highlights
the importance of working systematically and proactively with improving the
physical, organizational and social work environment board. The fact that
experience working environment is different from other types of ships shows that all
functions of passenger ships constitute a more intense working environment than
other types of ships. This may be due to the pressure of high responsibility, frequent
port calls, passenger contact and regular intensive and tense situations. In a study
of seafarers' sleep and fatigue, they found that seafarers working on cruise ships
were significantly more tired than those working on any other kinds of ship at sea,
since the frequent port calls and extra pressure of passengers on board. The main
causes of fatigue for seafarers are lack of sleep, heavy workload, physical
environment and stress. (Hystad & Eid, 2016)
8.6 Collective thinking
Collective thinking means when a team is paying too much attention to integrity, so
the team members will feel the pressure of reaching consensus on group norms,
which increases the pressure on conformity, and makes difficulty to get an objective
evaluation of unusual, minority or unpopular views. It is to say, when a team
expresses its opinions on a certain issue or matter, sometimes it is in a state of
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collective silence for a long time, and no one expresses their opinions, and then
people will unanimously pass it. Usually, the ideas of the main members of the team
who are authoritative, confident and like to express their opinions are more easily
accepted, but in fact, most people do not agree with this proposal. The reason for
this is that the team members feel the pressure of group norms demanding
consensus and are unwilling to express different opinions. At this time, the
individual's critical thinking and moral judgment will be affected and decline. In this
case, group decision-making is often unreasonable and failed. This happens when a
team focus on integrity too much and cannot evaluate its decisions and assumptions
with a critical attitude. The higher the cohesion of a collective, the more likely it is to
lead to group thinking errors. Therefore, collective thinking is "the deterioration of
psychological benefits, which comes from the pressure within the group" (Janis,
1972). As we all know, in work, people naturally tend to maintain a harmonious
working environment and are not willing to take the initiative to put forward different
opinions on a certain judgment or decision of their colleagues. The tendency of
collective thinking or maintaining harmonious organization is also one of the hidden
dangers of safe operation of ships (Lan, 2018).
8.7 Rank hierarchy
Power hierarchy is usually used to describe, even when people with low power level
can clearly judge that people with high power level's decision is incorrect or have
obvious doubts about it, but it is difficult to question it because of fear and worry.
Shipping industry, especially ship operation, has always followed the strict semi
militarized hierarchy system, which has laid an important hidden danger for poor
communication caused by power of rank. Taking the sank of M/V COSTA
CONCORDIA as an example, we learned from the accident report that before the
accident. Firstly, without effective communication with the bridge team, the captain
temporarily decided to change the original planned ship route. Then, during the
voyage, the captain violated the company's procedure of forbidding the use of
telephone on the bridge to make calls which unrelated to the navigation, which led to
the loss of real-time tracking and understanding of the ship's navigation status, and
did not realize that the ship had entered the dangerous waters in time. After the
accident happened, the captain's emergency response was slow, and the
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passengers were not evacuated effectively according to the Emergency Response
Plan (ERP). However, no bridge member was found to remind or question the
captain about this series of wrong behaviors.
8.8 Insufficient manning
With the increasingly fierce competition in the shipping industry, in order to ensure
profitability and competitiveness, some companies are operating the ship only with
minimum manning. It may be can meet the requirements of open sea navigation, but
it is not enough to cope with conjunction waters, and even less to meet the
requirements of maintenance, port operation and emergency response. Especially
for the current situation that most Asian cruise ships are old ships, they are facing
not only the disadvantages from old equipment and heavy maintenance workload,
but also have uncontrollable factors such as bad sea conditions and heavy traffic in
Asia, which lead to many maintenance tasks can only be carried out after berthing.
At the same time, they must face all kinds of pressure from port state, flag state and
company inspection. Even if the minimum manning is in line with the regulation, but
it will greatly increase the working load of the crew then effect the safety of ship.
9. Current countermeasures of cruise company
Safety management, including supervision and training, is generally considered as
the key means to solve accidents caused by human factors (Trucco, Cagno,
Ruggeri & Grande, 2008). Similarly, the cultivation of safety culture on board, the
rational allocation of human resources and the formulation of reasonable and clear
procedures are also considered to play a certain role in preventing accidents caused
by human factors (Kovats, 2006). Starting from these basic aspects, modern cruise
companies have made corresponding prevention and solutions to deal with the
impact of human factors on ship safety.
9.1 Modern maintenance theory
Modern ship maintenance theory mainly adopts three different ways for the
maintenance of ship machinery and equipment: Scheduled Maintenance (SM),
Breakdown Maintenance (BM) and Preventive Diagnostic Maintenance (PDM).
BM is carried out after the failure of ship equipment. Due to the fact that the faults of
some complex equipment of the ship cannot be predicted when some of its parts
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and components maintain good basic functions, or the lack of applicable detection
means and critical parameters for some complex equipment, some equipment does
not have the conditions for detection, so it can only be repaired after the fault
occurs.
SM is to demolish and repair the marine machinery and equipment according to the
specified time limit to prevent the occurrence of faults. It is mainly aimed at the
mechanical equipment with obvious fault loss period and equipment failure free
working period.
PDM refers to the continuous monitoring of mechanical equipment, recording the
specific operation status of the equipment, and quantitative analysis of its status
information, according to the actual situation to determine the repair time, so as to
avoid the occurrence of failure. Because the workload and cost are relatively small,
this method is the core of modern preventive maintenance (Wu, 2001).
Based on modern ship maintenance theory, cruise companies mainly use ship PMS
to carry out detailed regular maintenance plan for ship equipment. Its working
principle is: firstly, the ship owner collects and sorts out the equipment records,
spare parts inventory records and personnel records of the whole ship, divides the
ship equipment system according to the level and indicates the maintenance
requirements, and then puts them into the work order card of PMS system. The ship
manager (usually the master or the chief engineer) arranges specific maintenance
work for the crew. The system transmits instructions, orders and information
between the manager and the executor, forms a complete work record in the
system, and feeds back to the company management for inquiry and reading, so as
to timely and accurately monitor the actual situation of ship maintenance, and plan
and arrange the next maintenance progress in advance. Through the system to
develop and implement the ship equipment maintenance plan, it is conducive to the
implementation of the maintenance plan, strengthen the supervision of the
maintenance work, and improve the ship management level. It is of great
significance to extend the service life of ships and reduce the operating costs of
enterprises.
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9.2 Establishment of ERP
Through the development of detailed ERP, according to the impact degree of the
accident occurrence and development, the emergency deployment is divided into
the following stages shown in the Figure 7. Different stages have different response
personnel and corresponding actions shown in the Table 4. The master decides
whether to activate only the initial key personnel or all crew to evacuate the
passengers or even release the lifeboat to abandon the ship according to the
development of situation.

Figure 7 - Emergency Response Stages
Source: M/V COSTA ATLANTICA Emergency Response Plan

Table 4 - Emergency Response Stages Description
First Stage

Depending on the type of incident, the Master, OOW or senior

Response

officers must activate the appropriate assessment team as
designated in the ships muster list, to quickly assess the severity
of the incident then recommend to the Command & Control
whether to sound the Crew Alert or General Emergency Alarm.

Crew Alert

The crew alert signal signifies that all crew must proceed to their
assigned emergency duty stations. At this stage, a complete
muster will be conducted. Passengers, other than those required

33

to collect their children, are not involved, but they should be kept
informed thorough frequent broadcasts.
General
Emergency
Alarm

Any determination by the Master that an emergency can
compromise the safety of people on board will result in giving
the General Emergency Alarm. This signal is used for
summoning guests and crew to the Muster Stations and to
initiate the actions included in the Muster List.

Crew Survival

This order is given verbally through the chain of command for all

Craft Muster

crew to proceed to their assigned survival craft muster stations.
Containment Team, lifeboat preparation team, life raft
preparation teams and passenger muster teams, shall continue
their emergency duties.

Survival Craft

This order is given verbally through the chain of command to

Embarkation

move passengers and crew from their muster stations to embark
the survival crafts. When passenger embarkation process is
complete, passengers muster stations teams will be dismissed,
and each member must proceed to the assigned Crew Muster
Station.

Abandon Ship

This order is given verbally from the bridge directly by the
Master (or by the Second in Command if the Master is
incapacitated) to commence launching of the survival crafts. The
evacuation and abandonment procedures can be referenced for
further guidance.

Source: M/V COSTA ATLANTICA Emergency Response Plan

Before being assigned to shipboard duties, all persons employed or engaged on a
seagoing ship other than passenger, shall participate on familiarization training
including a personal survival technique or receive enough information. The
mandatory minimum requirements for vessel familiarization training and instruction
for all seafarers are defined in Section A-VI/I of STCW Code 95. The key positions
which shown in the Figure 8 will cover virous roles and combine essential teams to
response according to the ERP in case of emergency.
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Figure 8 - Key Departments in case of Emergency
Source: M/V COSTA ATLANTICA Emergency Response Plan

•

The Master's role in an emergency is to maintain a strategic overview of the
situation, so he must not be excessively involved in the actual operation of
emergency operations. His main responsibilities are: lead and organize ship
emergency response, to ensure that all necessary emergency functions are
in place, and to ensure that passengers often know the latest situation
through PA system. To ensure the safety of the ship, the overall well-being of
passengers and crew members, according to the nature and severity of the
accident, judge whether to upgrade the response level or even abandon
ship. And timely and appropriate liaison with Fleet Operation Center (FOC)
and Marine Emergency Response Service (MERS) Provider, authorities,
other support services, and ships in the area. If the master is incapacitated,
the staff captain must assume all the responsibilities of the captain.

•

Command & Control, whose responsibilities include: Strategically manage
the emergency as per ship’s ERP. Where responsibility for Command &
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Control or other emergency response activities need to be delegated, ensure
that they are assigned to a competent person. Keep the Master up to date
with all pertinent information on the management of the incident and
response. Monitor the general mustering situation of passengers and crew
meanwhile advise the Master accordingly. Monitor the stability situation,
advise the Master accordingly, and liaise with shore-based MERS providers
and shore support. Ensure internal communication and information flow is
maintained with the various emergency teams and maintain records of key
information.
•

The Bridge Team is responsible for the safe navigation of the ship and it
shall not be directly involved in managing other aspects of the emergency.
Inform Command & Control of any developing navigational situation that may
negatively affect the handling of the entire emergency. For example, the
course alterations with subsequent change of relative wind direction and
speed, influencing the smoke management, etc.

•

The On-Scene Command (OSC) oversees tactical measures to deal locally
with any emergency on the ship. The OSC is to ensure that Command &
Control is fully informed of the ongoing emergency response operations.
Responsible for the management of local resources needed to deal with the
incident and control the safety of the incident scene, including security of the
area and staging location. In case of the machinery space, the OSC will work
closely with the Technical Control as required to manage the support
organization and response team assigned to OSC to control the accident
scene.

•

Technical Control must ensure Command & Control is fully informed and
kept up to date on any technical situation that might influence the emergency
response levels. Responsible for providing tactical input during a machinery
space emergency response. Maintaining availability of relevant safety
systems including propulsion, steering, sources of power and the operation
of the emergency switchboard in case of emergency. Assisting Command &
Control in isolating affected areas and operating emergency systems like
releasing CO2 systems under captain’s instruction.
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•

Muster Control is responsible for all aspects of the mustering and evacuation
of all passengers and crew. Ensuring children and parents are reunited as
soon as possible when youth facilities are in operation. Accounting of
persons located in the medical facility, aiding passengers identified as
requiring assistance and always keep Command & Control fully informed of
the situation regarding passengers and crew mustering and evacuation.

•

Medical Control is responsible for the safety of patients in the shipboard
Medical Center, and for the reception and treatment of anyone sustaining
injury as a result of the emergency. In addition, Medical Control must liaise
with Muster Control to ensure that all patients under treatment in the ship’s
medical facility or in their cabins are relocated as needed.

Figure 9 - Reporting System in case of Fire Onboard
Source: M/V COSTA ATLANTICA Emergency Response Plan

The muster station is a safe place where all persons on board (passenger & crew)
must proceed when the General Emergency Signal is given, wearing the lifejacket
and waiting for orders. For example, as you can see the Figure 10 has shown the
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muster station arrangement for M/V CARNIVAL BREZZE, it has totally 9 passenger
muster stations and 3 crew muster stations, which can carry 3690 passengers with
1386 crew members as per SOLAS requirements. In case of some stations could
not be available because of disaster, alternative muster stations are also set up on
the both sides of embarkation deck for use.

Figure 10 - Muster Stations Arrangement
Source: M/V CARNIVAL BREEZE Emergency Response Plan

9.3 Improving crew quality
In order to improve and solve the language communication barriers of Asian cruise
crew, many fleets operating in Asia now choose to use Chinese officers, so that they
can use Chinese as a backup means when they are unable to communicate
effectively with other ships in English. However, due to many conflicts between
China's maritime education, examination and certification rules and the current
system of cruise companies, and the lack of cruise driving experience in China,
there are few officers suitable for the development of cruise in Asia. In the long run,
if we want to fundamentally change the situation of undesirable quality of seafarers
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in Asia, especially in China, we should start from the fundamental issue of maritime
education and training mode.
Among the 1.2 million seafarers in the world, the Philippine seafarers account for
more than 25%. Although the Philippines is a developing country, it is the most
important source country of seafarers in the world, which provides a good reference
for the cultivation of Chinese cruise officers. First, there are three main modes of
modern world navigation education, namely, consistent mode, sandwich mode and
comprehensive mode. The consistent training mode is a traditional continuous
training mode, in which students are arranged to practice on the ship after a period
of continuous study at school, and then obtain the practice certificate through the
examination; the sandwich training mode divides students' study into three stages:
study at school, practice at sea and then study again. The Philippines mainly adopts
the same comprehensive training mode as most European countries, that is,
undergraduate students need to complete one year of maritime practice based on
completing three years of theoretical study. In China, the consistent training mode is
adopted. Undergraduates study in school for three and a half years, and then
arrange a total time of no less than 22 weeks of marine practice. After passing the
exam, they can graduate. Thus, the maritime practice courses of students in
Philippine maritime colleges and universities are more than twice as many as those
in Chinese maritime colleges and universities, and the training mode is more
focused on the training of students' maritime practice skills.
Moreover, as far as the content of education and training is concerned, professional
courses and self-reliance training in the Philippines are mostly written in English,
and teaching is also taught in English. Besides professional English, most textbooks
in China are Chinese textbooks, and few teachers teach in English. Moreover, the
training is mainly exam oriented, ignoring the English teaching and cultivation of
students' ability of using English makes it impossible for them to apply what they
have learned to work effectively. Although there are some historical and humanistic
reasons, English, as an international working language, should be given enough
attention in maritime education.
The last point is school enterprise cooperation, which is also the fundamental
reason for the success of Philippine seafarer training. Because the Philippines
pursues market-oriented maritime education, the demand of enterprises is the
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direction of schools. In recent years, China has been advocating the mode of school
enterprise cooperation, but up to now, the scale of school enterprise cooperation is
still relatively limited, and many ways of cooperation just stay in the mode of order
cultivation.
9.4 Fatigue relief
According to STCW, seafarers must rest for 10 hours in any 24 hours and 77 hours
in any 7 days. The rest time can be divided into two periods, one for at least 6
consecutive hours, and the interval between the rest periods should not exceed 14
hours. Captain C.W. Filor believes that 39% of accidents reported at sea are related
to fatigue. IMO experts believe that the most effective way to deal with fatigue is to
ensure an effective sleep, which must have enough time and good continuity at the
same time. Everyone needs different sleep time, and it is generally considered that
an average of 7-8 hours is appropriate; and a sleep lasting for 7 hours is far better
than seven naps lasting for 1 hour. A survey on sleep problems shows that the
average sleep time at sea is 6.6 hours, and the continuity of sleep is poor, while the
sleep time of the crew on duty is less than 5 hours. There is no doubt that for the
crew, especially the personnel on duty, effective sleep is the premise to ensure the
safety of navigation.
Compared with cargo ships, cruise companies pay more attention to the fatigue of
crew. For example, the "6 + 2" duty system is adopted to replace the existing 4H or
6h duty system, and the duty time is recombined: the duty time of the first watch is
0600 ~ 0800 hours (2H) + 1200 ~ 1800 hours (6h), the duty time of the second
watch is 0000 ~ 0600 hours (6h) + 0800 ~ 1000 hours (2H), and the duty time of the
third watch is 1000 ~ 1200 hours (2H) + 1800 ~ 2400 hours (6h). In this way, the
rest time can be divided into a longer period and a shorter period on the premise of
ensuring that the officers on duty work 8 hours a day, which not only meets the
requirements of the Convention, but also makes the arrangement of rest time more
flexible, thus increasing the chance of getting enough sleep. With the advanced
work record system, the crew must clock in according to the work schedule before
starting work and clock out after work or rest. The department head and the director
of human resources on board will check whether the records comply with the
regulations and company procedures. Moreover, due to the more comfortable living
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condition of the cruise ship, frequent berthing can give the crew a short time to
travel, which greatly alleviates the mental fatigue of the crew.
The second is the manning problem. Unlike the minimum manning standard
adopted to reduce costs, most cruise companies adopt the dual watch system, that
is, two officers and two sailors are on duty together. At the same time, they are also
equipped with chief of staff, safety officer, chief mate, patrol fireman, security guard
and other posts to ensure that there are enough crew to deal with various
emergencies. This not only meets the requirements of BRM to reduce the single
person decision-making error rate, effectively alleviates the decision-making error
caused by excessive mental stress, but also greatly reduces the workload of
navigators in the process of on duty, so that they can focus on navigation tasks
rather than other tasks. The above system is basically used by all cruise companies.
However, in view of the actual situation in Asia, the traffic intensity is much higher
than that in other regions, which means that the workload and tension of drivers are
higher than that of other people. Therefore, shortening the cooperation period
appropriately can be used as an effective measure to relieve the pressure of crew
members, and the company can develop a more humane management, it will give
seafarers the right to apply for extension and shortening of the contract within a
certain range, so that they can reasonably choose the length of contract service
according to their own mental state
9.5 Implementation of BRM
BRM was inspired by CRM which widely used in aviation. It is the use and coordination of all available resources including people, equipment and procedures to
promote safety and enhance the efficiency of shipboard operations. In recent years,
with the continuous development of cruise technology, management concept and
the deepening of theoretical research on bridge resource management, more and
more cruise companies have adopted the bridge structure design based on
functional objectives, which adjusts and deploys the equipment according to the
division of personnel, and adjusts the personnel allocation flexibly according to the
function (Xuan, 2007). If the ship is in the critical period of entering and leaving the
port, the captain usually controls the ship, and other personnel report relevant
information to him. So, he needs to process multiple information at the same time,
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which will greatly increase the workload. Meanwhile, due to the influence of the
power hierarchy and collective thinking, it is difficult for other members of the bridge
team to put forward reasonable challenges to the captain's behavior or decision,
which leads to the safety risk grows up as well.
In recent years, based on the continuous in-depth research on bridge resource
management theory, more and more cruise companies have adopted functional
target-based bridge structure design which has shown in the Figure 11 and Table 5,
adjusted resources according to the division of labor. Deployment and staffing can
be flexibly adjusted according to functions, this has a very good mitigation effect on
the human factors caused by the power hierarchy and collective thinking.

Figure 11 - Assignment Functions According to Manning Level
Source: Carnival Corporation & PLC (2012) Bridge Resource Management Manual

Table 5 - Manning Level Description
Green Manning

Minimum bridge manning required underway. There is one
officer assigned two functions (Co-Navigator and
Administrator).

Yellow Manning

Used in situations were indicated by the Risk Analysis and
Bridge Manning Level Table. Compared to Green Manning, the
bridge team is strengthened by the Operations Director and
another able body ready to assume function of helmsman at
any time if required.

Red Manning

Always used for arrivals, departures and other situations
according to the risk analysis. In Red Manning the bridge must
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be in closed condition, the captain shall present with the
charge and assume one of the bridge team functions.
Source: Carnival Corporation & PLC (2012) Bridge Resource Management Manual

•

The Navigator is responsible for conning, navigating the ship following the
approved passage plan and collision avoidance. He must use “Thinking
Aloud” to share his intentions and planned actions to all bridge team
including the pilot, and ensure they are aware of the situation. And always
foster a climate that encourages other members of the bridge team to
challenge the him if warranted. In case the pilot has the conn, he should
ensure the pilot’s intentions and planned actions are well understood in
advance by all bridge team members and agreed upon by the Navigator.

•

The Co-Navigator should support, challenge, and recommend actions to the
Navigator. He is responsible for monitoring traffic and cross-checks the
actions of the Navigator, using real time navigation methods to check if the
ship's position against the passage plans. Notifies the Master or Second in
Command whenever he has reason to believe that the Navigator has taken
or plans to take any action that violates the captain’s orders or is inconsistent
with the safe navigation of the vessel. Unless directed otherwise by the
officer with the charge, he will take the responsibility for external VHF and
internal communications as directed liaison with the ECR. And in charge of
alarm management and actions. Alarms to be identified as either urgent or
non-urgent alarm. Responsible for logbook entries, checklist management
and status board as well.

•

The Operations Director usually will be assigned by senior officer, who will
manage UHF/ VHF Internal communications and responsible for monitoring
the safe embarkation or disembarkation of the Pilot. He should directly
monitor of both the Navigator and Co-Navigator, ensure that safe passage is
maintained and that no internal or external influences are permitted to
distract them from their primary tasks. Overview of the entire bridge
operation, workload and transfers tasks between functions as circumstances
dictate ensuring that it is carried out in accordance with procedures. Provides
guidance and suggestions to other members of the bridge team as
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necessary or appropriate. If the Operations Director has the charge, he can
assume any of the other functions at any time, but once the he takes the
conn, then the position of Operations Director must be re-established as
soon as possible.
•

The Administrator is the person who is responsible for alarm management
which should to be identified as either urgent or non-urgent alarm. internal
communications as directed and logbook entries, checklist management and
status board. Ancillary tasks as assigned as well.

•

The Helmsman directly steers the vessel by acknowledging and executing
steering orders which given by the person with the conn and advise him
about any steering concerns.

•

The Lookout must keep all time giving full attention to maintain all around
lookout by sight and hearing, reporting all sightings and sound signals to the
Navigator. Maintaining awareness of planned intentions and reports any
necessary clearances before an alteration of course, no other duties shall be
undertaken or assigned which could interfere with the task. The duties of the
Lookout and the Helmsman are separated, which means the helmsman shall
not be considered as lookout while steering, but he should be available to
interchange duties with the Helmsman if necessary.

In the bridge structure with functional objectives, the captain decides the bridge
team according to the ship's sailing status. For example, when the ship is navigating
in open water, the number of persons on duty can be appropriately reduced, and the
bridge can be kept full manning when entering and leaving the port. The Figure 12
shows the requirement of Carnival Cooperation BRM for manning in different traffic
and visibility situations.
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Figure 12 - Bridge Manning Level According to Risk Analysis
Source: Carnival Corporation & PLC (2012) Bridge Resource Management Manual

BRM not only allocates the corresponding human resources according to different
situations, but also creates a harmonious and orderly operation environment of the
bridge through reasonable resource allocation. For example, PRO (Plan Reason
Outcome) technique requires navigator should share his action plan, action reason
and desired effect with the whole bridge team before carrying out any action. At the
same time, every member of the team is encouraged to think aloud, which intends
develop a shared mental model of the current situation and future intentions in order
to prevent the development of a possible human error. On the other hand, any
officer, including the captain, may make mistakes or make wrong decisions.
Therefore, all bridge members have the responsibility to supervise the safe
navigation of the ship and have the obligation and right to challenge any suspicious
operation. The master shall encourage the bridge members to express any doubts
when they are uncertain or worried about the condition of the ship, without fear of
criticism, disciplinary action, ridicule or ridicule for questioning the decision-making.
It can effectively reduce the probability of collective thinking phenomenon by acting
on the questions raised by the query or telling the person who questions the
decision why he does not take any actions. Another example is to encourage the
captain to change from direct control of the ship to the role of a mentor or supervisor
for overall supervision. The reasonable division of bridge tasks is not only conducive

45

to promoting the learning of members and gaining practical experience through
operation, but also the direct participation of each member can enhance their
collective integration awareness and promote their identification with the company
culture, so as to effectively reduce the impact of hierarchical power and improve the
overall safety management level and efficiency.
10. Discussion
First of all, in terms of the overall environment, although the international community
is increasingly concerned about cruise safety. However, compared with the
European and American markets, the Asian market is still in the stage of
development and lack of enough experience. If we copy the European and
American market operation mode mechanically, it is difficult to meet the special
situation of Asia. At the same time, there is a lack of targeted thinking from the
perspective of legislation. In the future MSC, it is necessary to conduct regional
research and discussion on cruise safety, in order to establish a more effective legal
supervision system in combination with the reality of each region and the relevant
requirements of the port state government.
From the perspective of the ship itself, human factors are still an important hidden
danger leading to safety accidents. For example, although the problem of fatigue
has been widely discussed, and various companies have also formulated a series of
measures to prevent fatigue, it is difficult to have the same superior environment as
working on land due to the long-term industry characteristics of navigation. Only by
further improving the living environment and enriching the spare time life on board
can be beneficial to the mental health of the crew and alleviate the safety problems
caused by fatigue.
The company's procedures have been detailed and improved enough through
continuous updating, but the key to improving the safety factor depends on the
implementation of the procedures by the crew, especially considering the fact that
the English ability of the crew in the Asian cruise market is generally poor, which
makes the usual safety training and exercise particularly important. Although there
are detailed plans and arrangements, whether the quality can be guaranteed, it will
be a key factor difficult to control to improve the safety awareness of the crew.
Supervision and inspection are important, but considering that if it is too frequent, it
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will increase unnecessary workload, which requires the company's management
and crew to find a good balance. How to establish an efficient training exercise
supervision and management system will be the focus and difficulty of future
research, which can not only enable the crew to understand the emergency
measures, but also make it a natural response in an emergency At the same time, it
can also effectively supervise and inspect from the company level, truly improve the
ship safety level, and ultimately achieve a win-win situation.
In terms of cruise ship maintenance, due to the design of cruise ships makes ship
maintenance more complex than that of merchant ships, but the port stay time is
usually less than one day, and the higher demand than merchant ships for timely
service (Rodrigues & Nottebohm, 2008). In addition to the application of the existing
PMS system, it is also necessary to comprehensively consider and evaluate the
effectiveness of the existing best maintenance methods, formulate maintenance
plans in advance, and reserve relevant personnel and equipment, so that the cruise
ship can start work in time and go through customs clearance procedures after
berthing. In addition, Therefore, in order to improve the maintenance efficiency, in
addition to having well-trained and flexible crew resources, it may also be necessary
to introduce new technologies in ship design, such as separation of ship parts, so as
to dismantle and replace them at the port, so as to strengthen the maintenance plan,
improve the maintenance efficiency and save time.
In addition, it has been proposed that since human factors are unavoidable, the
development trend of unmanned intelligent ships seems to be able to effectively
reduce the safety risks caused by human factors. But in fact, unmanned ships bring
more human factors. Even if the ship will not be interfered by the operator's fault, the
operator is still a part of the intelligent system. When the system cannot solve some
problems, people still need to take over. Although quality and safety are the focus of
many literatures, the human factors that should be considered are still insufficient
(Ramos, Utne & Vinnem, 2018). At the present stage, unmanned intelligent
technology has not been fully applied in cargo ships. For cruise ships with high-risk
coefficient, whether unmanned technology can be adopted will be a topic worth
pondering.
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11. Conclusion
Based on GISIS database, this paper analyzed the accident records of Asian cruise
ships and found out that human error is still the main factor affecting their navigation
safety. In the form of questionnaire survey, made a statistical analysis of the specific
factors causing human errors. Combined with practical work experience,
summarized the main policies and countermeasures adopted by cruise companies.
After the analysis, it is not difficult to find that although a lot of efforts have been
made to ensure the safety of ships, there are still many aspects worthy of thinking
and research in order to improve for Asian cruise safety in the future.
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Questionnaire
Sample survey of Asian cruise fleet navigator
In order to further study the causes of human errors leading to Asian cruise safety
issues, promote the practical application of theoretical research results, and find out
the way to minimize the safety risk caused by human factors, a sample survey for
the captains and officers of Asian cruise fleet has been conducted. The main
purpose of this questionnaire is to estimate the factors that may affect human error.
Please participate in the survey as a representative of Asian cruise fleet. The
investigation is anonymous and strictly confidential.
1、Rank (Single choice questions)
○ Captain (Staff Captain)
○ Chief Officer (Safety Officer, Training Officer)
○ Officer on Watch (2nd Officer, 3nd Officer)
○ Cadet
2、Age (Single choice questions)
○ Under 25
○ 25-35 years old
○ 36-45 years old
○ Over 45 years old
3、Sailing Age (Single choice questions)
○ Less than 3 years
○ 3-5 years
○ 6-12 years
○ More than 12 years
4、Nationality
_____________________
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5、The following table lists the factors that may cause human error. Please choose
the degree of influence according to your own experience.

L-H

L-S

L-E

L-L

Unimportant

Important

Very important

(1 point)

(2points)

(3point)

Complexity of INS

○

○

○

Reliability of INS

○

○

○

Lack of Maintenance

○

○

○

System Failure

○

○

○

Unreasonable Design

○

○

○

Clear Procedure

○

○

○

Education Background

○

○

○

Training Onboard

○

○

○

Safety Drill

○

○

○

Navigation Information

○

○

○

Noise

○

○

○

Fatigue

○

○

○

Living Condition

○

○

○

Weather Condition

○

○

○

Traffic Situation

○

○

○

Collective Thinking

○

○

○

Rank Hierarchy

○

○

○

Communication Mistake ○

○

○

Insufficient Manning

○

○

○

Lack of supervision

○

○

○

Suggestions for supplement and modification
6、What other factors do you think affect human error
________________________
7、What do you think of the influencing factors listed in the questionnaire
________________________
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